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One of the more important insights in H.L.A.Hart’s The Concept of Law1 
comes on the very first pages of the book, where Hart insightfully observes 
that the typical appeal for a definition of “law” is not really a search for a 
definition at all, but is instead a mask for any of a number of somewhat 
different and less definitional questions.2 We are puzzled about some aspect 
of law, Hart maintains, such as the relationship between law and morality, 
or the role of rules in a legal system, or the function of force and coercion 
in the legal order, but we disguise our specific puzzlements in a quest for a 
definition.3 
Hart’s admonition about how to understand a request for a definition is 
sound advice, and it is no less sound because Hart himself turned out in the 
later chapters of his book to be unfaithful to his initial diagnosis and 
recommendation.4  Despite his claims in the first chapter that law might not 
be susceptible to traditional definition by necessary and sufficient 
conditions, despite the just-noted view that a request for a definition of law 
is typically a way of asking a different and more specific question about the 
character or operation of law, and despite his early explicit denial of the goal 
of seeking to define law at all,5 Hart proceeds in much of the balance of his 
book to offer what looks very much like a definition of law.  In particular, 
he comes close to defining law as the union of primary and secondary rules 
when combined with the internalization of the ultimate rule of recognition 
by officials.6  And although Hart never says precisely that this is a definition 
of law, many of his followers, critics, and commentators have taken it to be 
precisely that.7  
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Brian Tamanaha, in his provocative and important challenge to many of 
the central themes of contemporary English-language analytical 
jurisprudence,8 especially contemporary analytical jurisprudence from a 
legal positivist perspective, does not appear to make Hart’s mistake. In 
saying that ”[l]aw . . . is whatever social groups conventionally attach the 
label ‘law’ to,”9 Tamanaha avoids giving us an actual definition of law,10 
and thus distances himself from the many contemporary and not-so-
contemporary efforts to specify the necessary, essential, or sufficient 
conditions for some social phenomenon being law.11 And although 
Tamanaha recognizes, along with Joseph Raz,12 that different cultures may 
have different concepts of law, or that one culture’s concept of law may 
change over time, Tamanaha insists that even within our concept of law the 
diversity of phenomena that are labeled or understood as law over time and 
across cultures is simply too wide to make any attempt at generalization 
either fruitful or illuminating.13 
Tamanaha’s anti-essentialist project14 is an important voice in modern 
arguments about the nature of law. Along with various others who identify 
                                                
8.  BRIAN Z. TAMANAHA, A REALISTIC THEORY OF LAW (2017) [hereinafter TAMANAHA]. The 
salvo of qualifiers in the text is necessary, because jurisprudence has been practiced at least for 
generations and probably for millennia, because quite different styles of jurisprudential inquiry have 
existed in the past, because the style and focus of jurisprudential inquiry is even now different in other 
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9.  Id. at 194. 
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paper, just what functions a definition or theory is designed to serve. 
11.  It is perhaps worth noting that Tamanaha and I share a skepticism about the value or 
possibility of identifying the essential (or necessary) features of law. See Frederick Schauer, On the 
Nature of the Nature of Law, 98 ARCHIV FÜR RECHTS- UND SOZIALPHILOSOPHIE 457 (2012); Frederick 
Schauer, The Best Laid Plans, 120 YALE L.J. 586 (2010) (reviewing SCOTT J. SHAPIRO, LEGALITY 
(2011)). 
12.  Joseph Raz, Can There Be a Theory of Law?, in THE BLACKWELL GUIDE TO THE 
PHILOSOPHY OF LAW AND LEGAL THEORY 324 (Martin P. Golding & William A. Edmundson eds., 
2005). See also JOSEPH RAZ, BETWEEN AUTHORITY AND INTERPRETATION: ON THE THEORY OF LAW 
AND PRACTICAL REASON 91–97 (2009). 
13.  TAMANAHA, supra note 8, at 65–73. 
14.  The book under principal discussion here is part of Tamanaha’s longer and larger project, 
and thus includes BRIAN Z. TAMANAHA, BEYOND THE FORMALIST-REALIST DIVIDE: THE ROLE OF 
POLITICS IN JUDGING (2010), BRIAN Z. TAMANAHA, LAW AS A MEANS TO AN END: THREAT TO THE 













themselves as legal pluralists,15 Tamanaha is struck far more with the vast 
and seemingly foundational differences among so-called legal phenomena 
than with what, if anything, they may have in common. But in pursuing this 
agenda, and especially in purporting to offer a theory of law at all, 
Tamanaha may find himself closer to the essentialists whom he criticizes 
than he suspects, and the focus of this commentary is to explain why this 
may be so, and why searching for a theory of law, whether realistic or not, 
may be more the problem than it is the solution. 
I. MUST THEORY BE REALISTIC? 
As the title of Tamanaha’s book announces, he purports to offer us a 
realistic theory of law. And what could possibly be wrong with that, we 
might ask? But we cannot answer that question unless we have some idea 
of just what it is to be realistic. And here we might take as our guide the 
important observation about what it is to be “real” from the philosopher J.L. 
Austin. Using an unfortunately sexist metaphor and label, Austin explained 
that there were some words that were “trouser-words,” in the sense that it is 
not the word under inspection but some other word, often its opposite, that 
“wears the trousers.”16  Shorn of the sexist label, the basic idea is that we 
cannot know what some words mean without understanding what they are 
to be distinguished from. We do not know what is meant by “direct” or 
“directly,” for example, without understanding just which notion of 
“indirect” the speaker had in mind and intends to distinguish.17 But “real” 
was Austin’s principal example,18 and he insists that “a definite sense 
                                                
PRAGMATISM AND A SOCIAL THEORY OF LAW (1997). See also Brian Z. Tamanaha, A Non-Essentialist 
Version of Legal Pluralism, 27 J.L. & SOC’Y 296 (2000). 
15.  Perhaps most prominent among the contemporary legal pluralists is William Twining. See, 
e.g., WILLIAM TWINING, GENERAL JURISPRUDENCE: UNDERSTANDING LAW FROM A GLOBAL 
PERSPECTIVE (2009); WILLIAM TWINING, GLOBALISATION & LEGAL THEORY (2000); WILLIAM 
TWINING, LAW IN CONTEXT: ENLARGING A DISCIPLINE (1997); LAW’S ETHICAL, GLOBAL AND 
THEORETICAL CONTEXTS: ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF WILLIAM TWINING (Upendra Baxi, Christopher 
McCrudden & Abdul Paliwala eds., 2015). Tamanaha understands, correctly in my view, that there are 
multiple versions of legal pluralism. See Brian Z. Tamanaha, Understanding Legal Pluralism: Past to 
Present, Local to Global, 30 SYDNEY L. REV. 375 (2008). Perhaps most important is recognizing that 
legal pluralism as a claim about the vast diversity over time and place of legal systems is different from 
legal pluralism as the identification of multiple legal systems, including especially various forms of non-
state law, within the same geographic space. See Margaret Davies, Legal Pluralism, in OXFORD 
HANDBOOK OF EMPIRICAL LEGAL RESEARCH 805 (Peter Cane & Herbert M. Kritzer eds., 2010); Sally 
Engle Merry, Legal Pluralism, 22 L. & SOC’Y REV. 869 (1988). 
16.  J.L. AUSTIN, SENSE AND SENSIBILIA 15–19, 70–71 (G.J. Warnock ed., 1962). See also J.L. 
AUSTIN, Other Minds, in PHILOSOPHICAL PAPERS 76, 86–96 (J.O. Urmson & G.J. Warnock eds., 3d ed., 
1979). For useful commentary on the idea, see KEITH GRAHAM, J.L. AUSTIN: A CRITIQUE OF ORDINARY 
LANGUAGE PHILOSOPHY 173–84 (1977). 
17.  AUSTIN, SENSE AND SENSIBILIA, supra note 16, at 15–19. 
18.  Id. at 70–71. 












attaches to the assertion that something is real . . . only in the light of a 
specific way in which it might be, or might have been, not real.”19 A real 
duck might be contrasted with a toy duck, or a picture of a duck, or a duck 
decoy, and thus “the function of ‘real’ is not to contribute positively to the 
characterization of anything, but to exclude possible ways of being not 
real—and these ways are both numerous for particular kinds of things, and 
liable to be quite different for things of different kinds.”20 
And so too, we might think, with claims of theories to be realistic, 
including claims of theories of law to offer a realistic theory of law. 
Following Austin, we do not know just from the self-appellation of 
“realistic” exactly what the theory purports to tell us with its purported 
realism unless we have an idea of the kind of allegedly unrealistic theory 
that the realistic one seeks to rebut or supplement. With respect to 
Tamanaha’s realistic theory, therefore, we would initially want to know at 
least something about the theories that he believes are in some important 
and interesting way unrealistic.  
In the case of Tamanaha’s realistic theory, it is plain that his target and 
his contrast is with those theories of law that he believes to be unrealistic in 
the specific sense that they fail to capture the diversity of phenomena that 
are understood to count as law in different cultures and at different historical 
periods. To be even more specific, Tamanaha believes that the theories of 
law offered by such prominent positivist analytical jurisprudes21 as Joseph 
Raz,22 Scott Shapiro,23 Julie Dickson,24 Jules Coleman,25 and especially 
H.L.A. Hart26 are not theories of law as much as they are theories of the law 
as it contingently happens to be manifested in contemporary liberal 
democratic industrialized societies. But once we realize that societies that 
are not contemporary, not liberal, not democratic, and not industrialized 
                                                
19.  Id. at 70 (emphasis in original). 
20.  Id. 
21.  Tamanaha occasionally uses the term “jurisprudent” to designate those who study law from 
a theoretical academic perspective. TAMANAHA, supra note 8, at 57, 61. “Jurisprudent” certainly has an 
older and more distinguished provenance, see Jurisprudent, 1 OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 1522 
(Compact Edition 1971), but I prefer to follow Karl Llewellyn and use “jurisprude,” KARL LLEWELLYN, 
THE THEORY OF RULES 37 (Frederick Schauer ed., 2011), on the assumption that lack of pretentiousness 
trumps provenance almost every time. 
22.  JOSEPH RAZ, THE MORALITY OF FREEDOM (1986); JOSEPH RAZ, THE AUTHORITY OF LAW: 
ESSAYS ON LAW AND MORALITY (1979); JOSEPH RAZ, PRACTICAL REASON AND NORMS (2d ed., 
Princeton University Press, 1990). 
23.  SCOTT J. SHAPIRO, LEGALITY (2011). 
24.  JULIE DICKSON, EVALUATION AND LEGAL THEORY (2001). 
25.  Jules Coleman, Incorporationism, Conventionality, and the Practical Difference Thesis, in 
HART’S POSTSCRIPT: ESSAYS ON THE POSTSCRIPT TO THE CONCEPT OF LAW 99, 112 n.24 (Jules Coleman 
ed., 2001). 













have had what they understood as law, and have had what even might be 
considered law under our own concept of law, we are forced, Tamanaha 
argues, to confront the essential unreality of conventional theories of law, 
an unreality he seeks to correct with his own realistic theory of law.27 
Tamanaha situates his inquiry within the broad tradition of social legal 
theory,28 sometimes called socio-legal theory29 and sometimes sociology of 
law,30 and accordingly supports his claim about the provincialism of 
contemporary analytic positivist legal philosophy with an impressive array 
of historical and cross-cultural examples drawn from the sociological, 
anthropological, and historical literatures.31 These examples, and the 
secondary literature that analyzes them, provide extensive support for the 
conclusion that different societies at different times have had different views 
about the nature (or even the existence) of the distinction between law and 
other normative systems, such as those of etiquette and morality, and those 
that regulate sports and games; and that different societies have had 
different understandings of the functions of law, of its relationship to the 
political state, and of its systemic character, among other things. And thus, 
one of the many contributions of Tamanaha’s book is to bring this literature 
and this empirical dimension into contemporary jurisprudence, which all 
too often treats factual inquiry and empirical observation as beyond the 
scope of the jurisprudential project.32  
In attempting to incorporate this plurality or diversity of phenomena into 
a realistic theory of law, Tamanaha appears, at least on surface, to ignore 
one possible conclusion that follows from his empirical data—the 
possibility that there can be no theory of law at all. If the word “law” or its 
equivalents in other languages simply refers to a wide range of unconnected 
phenomena, or, more likely, refers to a cluster of interrelated phenomena 
sharing no common properties,33 one conclusion might simply be that there 
                                                
27.  TAMANAHA, supra note 8, at 80–81, 82–117. 
28.  Id. at 30–33. 
29.  See TAMANAHA, REALISTIC SOCIO-LEGAL THEORY, supra note 14. 
30.  See John Griffiths, The Idea of Sociology of Law and its Relation to Law and to Sociology, 
in LAW AND SOCIOLOGY 49 (Michael Freeman ed., 2006). 
31.  TAMANAHA, supra note 8, at 82–150. 
32.  A noteworthy exception is MICHAEL GIUDICE, UNDERSTANDING THE NATURE OF LAW: A 
CASE FOR CONSTRUCTIVE CONCEPTUAL EXPLANATION (2015), which valuably emphasizes the 
empirical dimension of philosophical conceptual analysis, a dimension that is often mentioned but rarely 
given more than lip-service. 
33.  I refer here to the idea of a cluster concept as developed by Max Black and John Searle and 
to the idea of a family resemblance most prominently associated with Ludwig Wittgenstein. See MAX 
BLACK, PROBLEMS OF ANALYSIS: PHILOSOPHICAL ESSAYS (1954); JOHN R. SEARLE, INTENTIONALITY: 
AN ESSAY IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF MIND 231–61 (1983); JOHN R. SEARLE, Proper Names, 67 MIND 
ASS’N 166 (1958); LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN, PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS ¶ 66 (G.E.M. Anscombe, 
P.M.S. Hacker & Joachim Schulte trans., 4th ed. 2009). The basic idea is that, as with Wittgenstein’s 












neither is nor can be a theory of law that captures this full diversity or 
normative phenomena. 
Indeed, although Tamanaha takes his view that whatever social groups 
conventionally label as “law” is law34 as a way of encapsulating his realistic 
theory, perhaps a better conclusion might be that this view summarizes the 
position that there neither is nor can there be a theory of law at all. And we 
might further conclude that this may not be such a bad thing. If legal 
phenomena are as plural and diverse as Tamanaha, William Twining,35 and 
other modern legal pluralists suppose, then maybe there is simply no theory 
of law at all.  
That there neither is nor can be a theory of law that captures law’s trans-
historical, trans-cultural, and trans-systemic diversity and complexity need 
not doom the enterprise of legal theory. Legal theory as a valuable activity 
is to be distinguished from, and is not dependent on, the production of 
theories of law.36 Although it might seem as if we should expect legal 
theorists to produce legal theories in the same way that we expect analysts 
to produce analysis, perhaps we should follow Oliver Wendell Holmes and 
have more modest insights for the enterprise. Commenting on the legal 
theories that were being produced during his time, Holmes quipped that “I 
care nothing for the systems—only the insights.”37  
Assuming that Holmes meant by “systems” what others, then and now, 
have meant by “theories,” there is more than a germ of truth in his 
observation. Some theories might fail in searching for coherence at the 
expense of ignoring important features of the phenomenon being explained, 
and much of Tamanaha’s critique of contemporary positivist analytic 
jurisprudence is of this variety. Joseph Raz, for example, sees law’s claim 
to authority as among the essential or necessary properties of our concept 
of law,38 but in searching for the properties that all instances of law possess, 
Raz may ignore the vast number of properties that most, even if not all, legal 
systems possess and that most, even if not all, non-legal phenomena do not 
                                                
famous example of “games,” there may be certain words or concepts that include various connected 
instances, but where there are no properties that all of the instances possess, and thus no properties the 
possession of which is necessary for proper application of the term. Interestingly, Hart himself 
entertained the possibility that law was a cluster or family resemblance concept, HART, supra note 1, at 
13–17, but he seems to have left this possibility by the wayside in subsequent chapters. 
34.  TAMANAHA, supra note 8, at 194. 
35.  See sources cited supra note 15. 
36.  See Susan Haack, The Pragmatist Tradition: Lessons for Legal Theorists, 95 WASH. U. L. 
REV. ___  (2018). 
37.  Letter from Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. to Harold J. Laski (Jan. 5, 1921), in 1 HOLMES-
LASKI LETTERS: THE CORRESPONDENCE OF MR. JUSTICE HOLMES AND HAROLD J. LASKI 1916–1935 
300 (Mark DeWolfe Howe ed., 1953). 













possess.  As a result, Raz’s essentialist approach may fail to capture the way 
in which law is differentiated from other social phenomena.39 Much the 
same problem appears to infect Scott Shapiro’s focus on planning as the 
organizing theory of law,40 and, if we go outside of the positivist tradition 
but still remain within the modern analytic jurisprudence canon, the same 
can be said of Ronald Dworkin’s view of law as interpretation.41  
But if all of these theories of law are, according to Tamanaha, deficient 
and unrealistic because of their incompleteness, we might worry that 
Tamanaha’s more complete (and thus, to him, more realistic) account is 
deficient precisely because of its completeness. There can be no doubt that 
Tamanaha views completeness and comprehensiveness as virtues, and the 
frequency with which he uses the word “holistic” to describe his own 
view,42 a view that encompasses the “totality” of the legal experience,43 
punctuates his impatience with those theories of law he perceives to be 
incomplete in important ways. Thus, Tamanaha wants us, he says, to include 
within the notion of the legal the possibility that there may be no 
demarcation or differentiation among legal and other normative systems,44 
the reality that many legal systems—international law, for example45—are 
unconnected with single political states,46 and the fact that many sources of 
normative guidance do not have the systemic character47 that Hart took to 
be the defining and necessary feature of a legal system properly so called.48 
But if all of this—and much more—is law, then perhaps so much counts as 
law, even if not now and here than at other times and elsewhere, that we 
may have lost not only any sense of what law is, but also an understanding 
of just how law is differentiated in the sociological sense from various other 
social phenomena.49  A theory of law that tries to include too much, or 
explain too much, may wind up explaining too little. 
                                                
39.  See FREDERICK SCHAUER, THE FORCE OF LAW 37–41 (2015); Schauer, On the Nature of the 
Nature of Law of Law, supra note 11; Schauer, The Best Laid Plans, supra note 11; Frederick Schauer, 
Necessity, Importance, and the Nature of Law, in NEUTRALITY AND THEORY OF LAW 17 (Jordi Ferrer 
Beltrán et al. eds., 2013). 
40.  SHAPIRO, supra note 23. 
41.  See RONALD DWORKIN, JUSTICE IN ROBES 221–27 (2006); RONALD DWORKIN, LAW’S 
EMPIRE 45–90 (1986); RONALD DWORKIN, A MATTER OF PRINCIPLE 119–77 (1985). 
42.  E.g., TAMANAHA, supra note 8, at 2, 4, 15, 16. 
43.  Id. at 1. 
44.  Id. at 48–51. 
45.  Id. at 151–93. 
46.  Id. at 51–56. 
47.  Id. at 84–93. 
48.  Hart, supra note 1, at 79–99. 
49.  On the sociological differentiation of law, see NIKLAS LUHMANN, A SOCIOLOGICAL 
THEORY OF LAW (Elizabeth King-Utz & Martin Albrow trans., 1985). For an attempt to connect the 
question of law’s differentiation from other social phenomena and other normative systems to the 












II. TAKING HOLMES SERIOUSLY 
Following Holmes’ lead and abjuring the theories (or systems) in favor 
of the insights,50 we might understand some of Tamanaha’s principal targets 
in a rather more charitable light. Scott Shapiro does indeed refer to his 
account as the “planning theory of law,”51 but rather than debate whether 
this is or is not a successful account of law’s essential properties in all 
possible legal systems in all possible worlds, we might perhaps say only, 
and more modestly, that understanding law’s planning function enables us 
to understand most modern instances of law better than we were able to 
previously. Similarly, even if Joseph Raz is mistaken in believing that the 
claim to authority is one of the very small number of properties that law 
must necessarily possess in order to be law,52 one would be foolish to ignore 
Raz’s profoundly insightful and properly influential account of the very 
nature of authority, both in law and elsewhere.53 The union of primary and 
secondary rules54 may not be the only or even the most important dimension 
of what makes a legal system a legal system, but Hart’s distinction between 
primary and secondary rules55 remains a remarkably useful tool in 
understanding how a large number of complex normative systems operate, 
just as his idea of internalization56 enables us to understand the foundations 
of a legal order and to appreciate, pace Tamanaha, the legal character of 
international law.57 And even if Ronald Dworkin’s attack on legal 
positivism ultimately fails both as an attack on positivism and as a self-
standing account of the nature of law,58 his observations about the role of 
interpretation in law and about the inability of a rule-like rule of recognition 
to explain what counts in legal decision-making59 have advanced our 
understanding both of what law is and of how it operates.           
                                                
analytic jurisprudential tradition, see SCHAUER, THE FORCE OF LAW, supra note 39, at 154–68; Frederick 
Schauer & Virginia J. Wise, Legal Positivism as Legal Information, 82 CORNELL L. REV. 1080 (1997). 
50.  See supra note 7 and accompanying text. 
51.  SHAPIRO, supra note 23, at 195. 
52.  RAZ, THE AUTHORITY OF LAW, supra note 22, at 28–33; Joseph Raz, Hart on Moral Rights 
and Legal Duties, 4 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 123, 131 (1984). 
53.  See authorities cited supra note 22; see also Joseph Raz, Introduction, in AUTHORITY 1 
(Joseph Raz ed., 1990). 
54.  HART, supra note 1, at 79–99. 
55.  Id. 
56.  Id. at 88–91. 
57.  On the use of Hart’s idea of internalization to explain the fundamentally law-like character 
of international law and the similarity between international law and foundational domestic law, see Jack 
Goldsmith & Daryl Levinson, Law for States: International Law, Constitutional Law, Public Law, 122 
HARV. L. REV. 1791 (2009). 
58.  As I believe it does, although not for the reasons commonly offered. See Frederick Schauer, 
The Limited Domain of the Law, 90 VA. L. REV. 1909 (2004). 













All of this applies as well, of course, to Tamanaha’s genuinely novel 
insights about the diversity of normative systems and his careful and 
thorough use of empirical information. We understand more about law 
when we understand the way in which different cultures or different parts 
of a larger society have dealt with the production and enforcement of social 
norms, with the resolution of disputes between and among citizens, and with 
the allocation of tasks between those with legal training and experience and 
those without. And we understand a great deal when we understand how 
law has changed and developed over time—Tamanaha thinks of this change 
and development as “genealogical”60—in response to political, 
psychological, economic, technological, and other changes in society. In all 
of this and more, Tamanaha’s socio-legal and empirical information, 
insights, and analysis have advanced our understanding in much the same 
that Raz’s analysis of authority, Hart’s of internalization and 
systematization, Shapiro’s of planning, and Dworkin’s of interpretation and 
legal sources have done using slightly different tools.   
In this sense, Tamanaha may have saddled himself with unnecessary 
burdens by choosing to designate his contribution to legal understanding as 
a theory of law, for in doing so he invites others to advance their own 
theories and attack his. Insofar as a theory purports to be a comprehensive 
account of an important social (or, for that matter, natural) phenomenon, we 
find ourselves in a zero-sum game, in which only one theory can be correct, 
and all of the others therefore mistaken.  
Thus, part of my worry about Tamanaha’s highly valuable book is that 
calling it a “theory” may undercut its value and may lead others with their 
own theories to discount what Tamanaha has to say. But part of my worry 
is also about the designation of his theory as “realistic.” As natural scientists 
who conduct laboratory experiments know, and as social scientists who 
search for natural experiments know as well, often we learn a great deal 
from isolating a particular variable, even if in doing so we ignore all of the 
other relevant variables by holding them constant, however artificial and 
therefore unrealistic the process of holding them constant may be.61  
In the context of theorizing about law, I prefer to designate this process 
as “analytic isolation.”62 Just as the medical researcher attempting to 
                                                
60.  TAMANAHA, supra note 8, at 82–117. 
 
61.  On the application of scientific method to thinking about non-natural social phenomena, see 
especially GARY KING, ROBERT O. KEOHANE & SIDNEY VERBA, DESIGNING SOCIAL INQUIRY: 
SCIENTIFIC INFERENCE IN QUALITATIVE RESEARCH (1994). 
62.  See FREDERICK SCHAUER, PLAYING BY THE RULES: A PHILOSOPHICAL EXAMINATION OF 
RULE-BASED DECISION-MAKING IN LAW AND IN LIFE vii–viii (1991). 
 












determine whether substance X is a causal factor in the incidence of disease 
Y ignores questions about the economics, politics, and morality of producing 
X as well as the economics, politics, and morality of treating Y, so too might 
one who theorizes about law pluck one feature of law out of its sociological 
and cultural home for closer inspection and analysis, in the hope that what 
we have learned from this process of isolating one feature or property or 
phenomenon will, along with numerous other exercises that isolate various 
other features, help in the totality of things to understand the larger setting 
in which the isolated feature occurs. And if looking closely at one feature 
while intentionally ignoring all of the others with which that feature is 
combined in reality produces the claim that the enterprise of analytic 
isolation is unrealistic, then so be it. 
III. LAWNESS 
One possible consequence of examining the various components of 
many different manifestations of law over time and across cultures is that 
we may wind up, as Tamanaha helps us to understand, identifying a large 
number of features of many modern legal systems that do not appear in some 
of those systems and did not appear in other systems at other times. There 
is nothing amiss and nothing that should be startling about this state of 
affairs, and thus we might come up with a list of characteristic features of 
most of the legal systems in most twenty-first century industrialized 
democracies, including a differentiated (from other professions) legal 
profession, a systematically organized collection of social rules, a 
mechanism for engaging in common transactions of commerce and 
exchange, a system of coercion to enforce both the constitutive and 
regulatory rules, and various other noteworthy features. In some sense, and 
while acknowledging the provinciality of the characterization, we might 
then consider this a prototype of law or, to use Max Weber’s terminology, 
an “ideal type”63 of law, even as we recognize that there is nothing ideal in 
any broader or evaluative sense about an ideal type and even as we 
acknowledge that others at other times and in other cultures might have 
different prototypes or ideal types. 
Once we have identified a prototype or ideal type, we might then proceed 
to characterize other normative systems by their degree of relevant 
resemblance to the prototype, and we might further designate this degree of 
resemblance—or similarity—as the lawness of a system. In doing so, we 
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avoid the hoary debates about, for example, whether international law really 
is or is not law,64 or whether customary law is law.65 Instead we can say that 
international law, for example, shares many properties with the standard or 
prototype case of a municipal legal system—primary and secondary rules, 
internalization (in the Hartian sense) by officials, the claim of authority (in 
the Razian sense), and an identifiable cohort of specialist practitioners—and 
lacks some of the properties that those systems possess—an elaborate and 
effective system of coercion, and what John Austin called a “habit of 
obedience.”66 In that sense international law possesses a considerable 
degree of lawness, but differs from the ideal type in some interesting and 
important ways. And it is not clear that anything more needs to be said about 
whether international law is “really” law or is really not.  
Much the same could be said about another topic that Tamanaha 
explores—the status of non-state rule systems,67 whether those systems be 
formally unconnected with political states, as with the National Football 
League or the American Philosophical Association, or whether they be 
extra-national coalitions of political states, such as the World Trade 
Organization or Organization of Petroleum Exporting States, or whether 
they be extra-legal and illegal organizations, such as the Mafia. Again, in 
some respects each of these systems resembles the ideal type in having 
primary and secondary rules, in making claims of authority over their 
participants, and in containing a formal dispute-resolution mechanism, 
among others, but each also lacks the connections with the political state 
and the pretensions of comprehensiveness that characterize the typical state-
based legal system.68 
Thinking of the degree of similarity between some normative system and 
the ideal type in terms of a degree of lawness has some virtues, but I do not 
mean to suggest that developing a metric of lawness is the necessary 
corollary of being skeptical—as is Tamanaha—about the possibility of 
defining law in terms of necessary and sufficient conditions,69 or of being 
skeptical—against Tamanaha—about the virtue of developing a 
comprehensive theory of law. Indeed, one of the ways in which Tamanaha’s 
account of law might be considered expansive—and perhaps excessively 
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so—is in terms of trying to develop an account—or theory, if you will—
that combines the reasons for having law (or the origins of law) with the 
identification of what law is with the consequences of having law. If we 
were thinking of hammers, we might suppose it obvious that the history of 
the development of hammers, the properties of a hammer, and the functions 
and values of hammers are three different—but admittedly 
interconnected—topics. And perhaps the same holds true of law. 
At the beginning of his book, Tamanaha aligns himself closely with the 
American Pragmatists, and thus with their skepticism about abstraction, a 
priori reasons, and fixed principles, among the other vices that the 
Pragmatists saw in non-Pragmatist philosophy.70 But in the very same 
passage from William James that Tamanaha quotes in order to reaffirm this 
point, James advocates a philosophical method focused on “action and 
towards power.”71 As other Pragmatists might have put the same point, the 
focus ought to be in function, purpose, and payoff. Indeed, as James also 
said, “[i]deas become true just in so far as they help us to get into 
satisfactory relations with other parts of our experience.”72 Whether 
Pragmatism is sound as a theory of truth has been long debated,73 but a 
somewhat less controversial dimension of the Pragmatist project is its desire 
to evaluate or understand philosophical contributions by the extent to which, 
and the way in which, they assist us in managing the tasks that we confront 
in our non-philosophical lives. But it is not so clear what payoff is to be 
derived from offering or even having a theory of all of law, and the well-
known Pragmatist skepticism about abstraction74 might lead to skepticism 
about the very value of a category as large as the category of law. Insofar as 
Tamanaha seeks to expand the categories of law and legality even further, 
it becomes in at least one way more abstract, however much the expansion 
is grounded in non-abstract empirical observations. Thus, given the 
diversity of law that Tamanaha so insightfully describes and explores, it 
may be that the production of a general or comprehensive theory of law, 
whether realistic or not, is in the final analysis unfaithful to the core ideas 
and goals of the Pragmatist project. 
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CONCLUSION: THE VIRTUES AND LIMITS OF NON-EMPIRICAL PHILOSOPHY 
AND NON-PHILOSOPHICAL SOCIOLOGY 
Joseph Raz has observed, notoriously for some of us, that “[t]he 
sociology of law provides a wealth of detailed information and analysis of 
the functions of law in some particular societies. Legal philosophy has to be 
content with those few features which all legal systems necessarily 
possess.”75 Even if we ignore what seems to be more than a bit of a 
condescending sniff at sociology from the perspective of the lofty perch of 
philosophy, there still emerges the claim that sociological and philosophical 
inquiry into the phenomenon of law are two largely distinct enterprises. One 
of the many virtues of Tamanaha’s work, including but not limited to this 
most recent book, is that it challenges this separation. The Tamanaha oeuvre 
contains the subtext that we cannot do serious philosophizing about, or 
conceptual analysis of, law unless we have a much better empirical sense of 
the terrain that has traditionally characterized the enterprise of philosophy 
of law. But by engaging in serious and knowledgeable engagement with the 
most important contemporary and non-contemporary works of legal 
philosophy, he also can be understood as claiming, even if less overtly, that 
one cannot do serious empirical examination about the characteristics and 
operation of law without the kind of conceptual clarification, terminological 
precision, and analytic acuity that philosophy at its best is able to offer. 
Indeed, if one understands the main theme of A Realistic Theory of Law as 
castigating contemporary analytical philosophy of law for its empirical 
ignorance and narrowness, perhaps Tamanaha’s next book, and one he is 
almost uniquely qualified to write, should be An Analytic Sociology of 
Law.76 As it is, far too much legal sociology is less systematic and careful 
about its empirical categorizations and causal attributions as it might be, and 
if sociological inquiries into law were as well-informed by contemporary 
philosophy of law as Tamanaha urges philosophical inquiries into law to be 
informed by the best empirical research, we might wind up with the kind of 
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advances in understanding that rigid disciplinary boundaries sometimes 
advance but perhaps even more often impede.   
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